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Research Note 
Comparative Policy Analysis 
The Design of Measures 
Charles W. Anderson 
Once again, political scientists are turning their attention to the concrete 
problems of their own time and place. After a generation of dedication 
to the canons of "pure science," there is a renewed enthusiasm for the 
potential of the discipline as a policy science. The desire to build greater 
powers of policy analysis into political science is evident in a wide va- 
riety of recent work and discussion. Thus, in his 1969 presidential ad- 
dress to the American Political Science Association, David Easton an- 
nounced the emergence of the "postbehavioral revolution," one aspect 
of which is the growing feeling that political scientists ought to be more 
actively involved in the examination of critical public issues.l William 
and Joyce Mitchell structured a recent introductory textbook so that the 
student sees public problem solving as the central purpose of political 
analysis.2 So, too, the Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes 
of the Social Science Research Council sponsored an evaluation of the 
role of political scientists in the study of public policies, which they saw 
as the most urgent and timely question facing the discipline.3 Surveys of 
the role of policy analysis in the political science curriculum have been 
conducted.4 And a new body of literature in the field of policy making 
and policy analysis is rapidly developing.5 
1 David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," American Political 
Science Review, LXIII (December 1969), 1051-61. 
2William and Joyce Mitchell, Political Analysis and Public Policy: An Intro- 
duction to Political Science (Chicago, 1969). 
3 Austin Ranney, ed. Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago, 1968). 
4Charles 0. Jones, "The Policy Approach: An Essay on Teaching American 
Politics," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII (May 1969), 284-93. 
5 In addition to the writings cited in other notes, books that indicate the temper 
of this new interest would include: Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth H. Gergen, 
eds. The Study of Policy Formation (New York, 1968); Ira Sharkansky, ed. 
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Of course, the term "policy analysis" does not identify a single re- 
search orientation. Some scholars focus on specific kinds of public poli- 
cies as a way of sharpening our observations and explanations of politi- 
cal phenomena. They seek to show how the policy-making process varies, 
depending on the particular issue under consideration.6 Others are speci- 
fically concerned with the evaluation of policy outcomes and their impact 
on the political system.7 Still others are interested in the general, ab- 
stract delineation of policy-making processes.8 
In the present article we shall be concerned primarily with the 
aspects of policy analysis related to the problem of public choice and 
with the role of comparative politics in that endeavor. The intellectual 
task becomes that of the definition and clarification of public problems, 
the search for alternative public means for coping with these problems, 
and the analysis of probable consequences that would follow from the 
adoption of particular courses of public action.9 In a sense, the vantage 
point of the political scientist shifts from that of detached observer to 
that of surrogate policy maker. An appropriate analogy is to the orienta- 
tion of the economist who postulates a certain set of public objectives 
and seeks to determine the course of action most appropriate to their 
realization. Giovanni Sartori states well the distinction as it applies to 
the problem of development: "With reference to economic develop- 
ment the economist is a planner, with reference to political development 
the political scientist is a spectator. The economist intervenes: His 
knowledge is applied knowledge. The political scientist awaits: He ex- 
plains what happens, but does not make it happen." 10 
Policy Analysis in Political Science (Chicago, 1970); Theodore J. Lowi, The End 
of Liberalism (New York, 1969). 
6 Examples of this approach include: Theodore Lowi, "American Business, 
Public Policy, Case-Studies and Political Theory," World Politics, XVI (July 
1964), 677-715; Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, 
American Business and Public Policy (New York, 1964); Lewis A. Froman, 
"The Categorization of Policy Contents" in Austin Ranney, ed. Political Science 
and Public Policy, pp. 41-52. 
7 Edward Suchman, Evaluative Research (New York, 1967); Richard C. Snyder 
and James A. Robinson, National and International Decision-Making (New York, 
1961), p. 29. 
8 Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs, 1968); 
David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York, 
1963); Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (San Francisco, 1968). 
9 An insightful consideration of the implications of this approach appears in 
James W. Davis, Jr. and Kenneth Dolbeare, Little Groups of Neighbors: The Se- 
lective Service System (Chicago, 1968), pp. 191-93. 
10 Giovanni Sartori, "Political Development and Political Engineering," in John 
D. Montgomery and Albert 0. Hirschman, eds. Public Policy, XVII (Cambridge 
[Mass.], 1968), p. 261. 
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In recent years the training of political scientists has focused on de- 
fining situations, while economics has developed habits of thinking 
toward strategies of action. One powerful statement of the economist's 
style which has special applicability to comparative analysis is found in 
the work of the Dutch economist and Nobel laureate, Jan Tinbergen."l 
The project I shall describe for comparative politics is basically an ex- 
tension of Tinbergen's way of thinking to the conventional concerns of 
political science. I have also been interested in defining approaches to 
policy analysis that were jointly political and economic, for these aspects 
of policymaking are never separate in practice.12 
Comparative Politics and Policy Analysis 
In the present effort to build an applied political science, the focus is 
inward, on the problems of our own society. It is the product of a 
generation that sees Western society passing through a most urgent and 
critical period. That generation wishes to develop professional skills 
that are useful in the diagnosis and resolution of these problems. The 
potential contribution of comparative politics to this endeavor is not 
immediately apparent. The postwar renaissance of comparative politics 
came at a time when the problems of other peoples, particularly in the 
developing areas, seemed far more urgent than those of the West. Cer- 
tainly, we would not want to argue that the new internationalism of 
American political science should be abandoned and that we turn in- 
ward, in response to the mood of the times. The more tantalizing problem 
is to specify how the skills of systematic comparative analysis can con- 
tribute to the problem-solving resources of any given society. 
Of course the cosmopolitan intellectual, aware of developments and 
possibilities in other cultures, has always been a critical agent of change. 
He has served as something of a broker of good ideas between nations, 
and, more often than not, he has seen foreign experience from the 
perspective of the problems of his own nation. As Alexis de Toqueville 
points out in respect to his inquiries into the status and prospects of the 
American democracy, "It is not, then, merely to satisfy a legitimate 
11 Jan Tinbergen, Economic Policy: Principles and Design (Amsterdam, 1956) 
and Central Planning (New Haven, 1964). It should be noted that I am dis- 
tinguishing Tinbergen's work on policy analysis from his pioneering research in 
econometrics. This framework was used in an interesting comparative study of 
economic policy making: E. S. Kirschen et al., Economic Policy in Our Time, 
3 vols. (Chicago, 1964). 
12 Additional perspectives on the uses of political economic reasoning in politi- 
cal science are suggested in William C. Mitchell, "The New Political Economy," 
Social Research, XXXV (Spring 1968), 78-110. 
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curiosity that I have examined America; my wish has been to find there 
instruction by which we may ourselves profit." 13 
In recent years, the emphasis in comparative politics has been on cul- 
tural detachment. The stance of a de Toqueville has been exchanged 
for that of a Herskovitz or a Malinowski. Nonetheless, the longer tradi- 
tion of comparative analysis has aspired to policy relevance. The classi- 
cal tradition of comparison involved the inductive examination of diverse 
cases in an attempt to establish, in Aristotle and Montesquieu, principles 
of constitutional form, in Machiavelli, explicit maxims of statecraft. 
The currently maligned late nineteenth-century emphasis on constitu- 
tional engineering did, as Harry Eckstein points out, accompany the great 
period of constitution writing in the West. The role of the political scien- 
tist in the diffusion of liberal democratic institutions in that period 
perhaps parallels the present-day work of economists in spreading the 
paraphernalia of post-Keynesian economic institutions and practice.l4 
In the postwar emphasis on the politics of the developing nations there 
was also some consciousness of the implications of analysis for policy 
recommendation. 
A preoccupation with macropolitics no doubt limits the practical 
utility of comparative analysis. Since Aristotle, the emphasis has been on 
the normative evaluation of total political systems. Taxonomies of politi- 
cal forms have been constructed, and the advantages and disadvantages 
of different ypes of government weighed. This tradition has been carried 
into even the most contemporary research. Political development is 
usually discussed in terms of the relative merits of mass mobilization, 
military, tutelary, and democratic systems. This focus on the largest 
question of politics, the structure of the regime itself, probably has some- 
thing to do with the limited policy relevance of the field. After all, the 
architectonic act of government is rare. Moreover, when it happens, the 
expert analyst plays little role in the outcome. By and large, compara- 
tive politics has not adopted styles of analysis pertinent to "normal" 
politics, to that "piecemeal social engineering" that Karl Popper com- 
mends as the appropriate approach of the policy analyst in a democratic 
society.'5 
Total political institutions and processes emerge out of a specific cul- 
13 Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America (New York, 1945), 1:14-15. 
14 Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present," 
in Harry Eckstein and David A. Apter, eds. Comparative Politics: A Reader 
(New York, 1963), pp. 10-23. 
15 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London, 1945), 1:138-48. 
This, of course, is also the message of Charles E. Lindblom's notion of incre- 
mentalism. See especially his The Intelligence of Democracy (New York, 1965). 
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ture and history. One uproots and transplants them at great peril, if one 
is able to at all. As Daniel Lerner suggests, institutions are not as apt to 
be transferred as transformed, with consequences that are hard to fore- 
see.l6 It is hard for systematic social science to say much about the trans- 
fer of larger institutions except in an historical sense. The extraordinary 
circumstances that lead to such diffusion of institutions is usually far 
removed from the systemic, normal process of politics that afford us the 
basis for such sensible judgments on the probable course of events as 
we are able to make. 
The problem, then, is to find an approach to comparative policy 
analysis that deals more with the bits and pieces of politics than with 
overall structures and processes. 
The Design of Measures: A Problem for Comparative Analysis 
Politics is always a matter of making choices from the possibilities 
offered by a given historical situation and cultural context. From this 
vantage point, the institutions and procedures of government and the 
legitimate powers of the state to shape the course of economy and so- 
ciety become the equipment provided by a society to its leaders for the 
solution of public problems. They are the tools of the trade of state- 
craft. Metaphorically, we can imagine, as Herbert March and James 
Simon do, that the heritage of means, embedded in political structures, 
is like a "warehouse full of semifabricated parts." The normal process 
of decision making, as they suggest, involves a long search through a 
sequence of means and ends, until a formula for action is found in the 
existing repertoire of programs and techniques.'7 The skillful policy 
maker, then, is he who can find appropriate possibilities in the institu- 
tional equipment of his society. Furthermore, seen in this way, the ca- 
pacities of leaders are conditioned by the nature of the possibilities that 
the political system offers them. 
In fact, politics seems to be more of an adaptive than an innovative 
art. True political invention is relatively rare. Creative statecraft seems 
far more like husbandry-a matter of adapting to changing conditions by 
nurturing selected strains and species-than like technological discovery 
and invention.'8 
16 Daniel Lerner, "The Transformation of Institutions," in William B. Hamil- 
ton, ed. The Transfer of Institutions (Durham, 1961), pp. 3-26. Another reveal- 
ing commentary on such problems is David Reisman's "Football in America: A 
Study of Culture Diffusion," Individualism Reconsidered (Glencoe, 1954), pp. 
242-57. 
17 Herbert March and James Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958), p. 191. 
18 This seems consistent with Carl Friedrich's reflections on political creativity 
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The role of the policy analyst becomes apparent. He assists in con- 
structing an inventory of potential public capabilities and resources that 
might be pertinent in any problem-solving situation; he tries to evaluate 
the applicability of alternative combinations of actions; and he seeks to 
evaluate the potential and actual consequences of patterns of public 
action. One function of comparative policy analysis might be to extend 
the process of policy search, policy formulation, and evaluation across 
the jurisdictional frontiers of a single policy, and thus to enrich the 
problem-solving capabilities of any society. 
Procedural Instrumentation 
The first issue of public problem solving is to decide how to decide. 
The practical question is how to fashion a decision-making procedure 
that will result in the most adequate public choice. The problem is one 
of the choice, orchestration, and sequence of techniques of participation, 
consultation, research, and deliberation that will insure the effective 
consideration and resolution of a public issue. 
Karl Deutsch sees procedural instrumentation primarily in terms of 
the information functions of governing, and suggests the role of com- 
parative analysis. 
The channels and institutions by means of which a government or a 
party obtains and uses information concerning its own constituency 
and personnel and the efficiency with which such information is col- 
lected, applied and perhaps stored for future use in records or in the 
memories of men, are all promising objects of comparative political 
studies. In democracies, such studies may deal with the comparative 
effectiveness of hearings, opinion polls, "grass roots" politics, pressure- 
group activities and the like. In dictatorships . . . such studies may 
throw some light on the ability of particular political regimes or or- 
ganizations to appraise their own internal resources and obstacles, and 
to steer their own behavior accordingly.'9 
Constitutional rules are the most general body of procedures. These 
must be invoked for all classes of decisions committing the polity. Ad- 
ditional specifications may be made for particular kinds of decisions, 
such as consultation with economic advisors or central banking author- 
ities for certain types of economic decisions. There may be certain con- 
in Man and His Government (New York, 1963), pp. 367-84. The view also seems 
compatible with Thomas L. Thorson's imaginative argument that the biological 
rather than the physical sciences provide the more propitious metaphor for po- 
litical inquiry. See his Biopolitics (New York, 1970). 
19 Karl Deutsch. The Nerves of Government (New York, 1963), p. 160. 
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ventions or customs relating to consultation between major groups in the 
society. All of these are part of the "procedural equipment" of the so- 
ciety. In addition, there is a complex legacy of possible forms of con- 
sultation, investigation, study, and deliberation that may or may not 
be activated, depending on the content of the particular decision at hand 
and the judgment of those involved as to what is appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
In all procedures, there is a certain discretion left to the policy maker 
as to how a particular institution or process will be used in the formula- 
tion of a specific decision. For example, in his relationship with the 
legislature, one "policy entrepreneur" may feel that his task is done 
when he has prepared a technically competent proposal. It is then up to 
legislative leaders to generate political support for the measure. In other 
words, in his own vision of the procedural scheme, the policy maker 
"uses" the legislature to generate consent. Another policy maker may 
understand his job as that of presenting the legislature wih a politically 
feasible proposal. For him, it might be appropriate to "equip" his policy- 
making procedure with an ad hoc committee of the powerful to refine 
the administration proposal into politically acceptable form. For the 
point of view of this policy maker, the only planned use for the legisla- 
ture is that of formal ratification. Albert 0. Hirschman provides an 
illustration of precisely this point in his study of the formulation of an 
agrarian reform law in Colombia.20 
From this point of view, the institutional heritage of a society, as well 
as both formal and informal protocols that attach to how decisions will 
be made, constitutes a stock of equipment available to decision makers 
for the development of public choices. One function of comparative 
analysis, then, includes the inventory of the "warehouse full of semi- 
fabricated parts" available to policy makers in fashioning decision sys- 
tems. In the comparative evaluation of political systems, we might want 
to focus on the richness and flexibility of the procedural equipment 
provided to decision makers by the political system. It also becomes 
possible to evaluate the performance of policy makers, i.e., the effective- 
ness of their use of the institutional resources made available to them 
by their society.21 
The design of procedures for specific problem-solving situations also 
becomes a choice target for applied political science. Based on his 
20 Albert 0. Hirschman, Journeys toward Progress (New York, 1963), pp. 
144-45. 
21 This is what Hirschman tried to do in his study of "Reformmongering" in 
Latin America. See his Journeys toward Progress. It is is also the theme of 
Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern Spain (Madison, 1970). 
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knowledge of the procedural repertoire of a particular political system, 
the analyst may be able to recommend innovative ways of going about 
the business of formulating policy in particular issue areas. 
The possibility of such procedural engineering raises some serious 
problems about the role of the policy analyst as policy adviser. Econo- 
mists have faced these, too, and they have not succeeded in resolving 
them satisfactorily. Normally, the economic adviser's art is that of 
fashioning measures adequate to the achievement of objectives specified 
by the political authorities. If extended to the process of procedural 
instrumentation, such a definition of the role of the policy analyst would 
result in a crude Machiavellianism, a matter of expediting the policy 
maker's purposes. After all, what the policy maker seeks in manipulating 
procedure is the achievement of his goals, the reduction of friction, 
conflict, skepticism, and "cognitive dissonance." The purpose of a well- 
contrived procedural system is not this, of course, but rather the exposure 
of alternative formulations of the problem, the elaboration of different 
courses of action, and the delineation of potential consequences as seen 
by the interests to be affected. 
It is of course the faith of the democrat that the policy makers' desire 
to fashion a relatively frictionless, efficient decision system should be 
resisted. The purpose of democratic procedure, after all, is not to make 
policy making easier, but to make it more adequate. 
There are at least three tests of the adequacy of a procedural system 
that can detach evaluation from the purposes of political leaders. First, 
how broad is the range of problems, how rich and flexible the alterna- 
tives that are generated for the consideration of policy makers? Second, 
and complimentary to the first, what is the comparative efficiency of 
the system in coming to conclusions, in reducing alternatives and possi- 
bilities to definitive choice? 22 Third, how close is the fit between intention 
and outcome? We assume that no public policy is "perfect," in the sense 
that it has no unanticipated consequences. However, we also assume 
that better policies correctly anticipate and provide for more of the con- 
sequences of choice. Since policy making is an ongoing process, the 
consequences of a decision made at time X become the problem to be 
solved at time Y. The statement of the problem at time Y represents the 
unfinished business of a choice made at X. Why then was the problem 
posed at Y not resolved at time X? We may find that the situation has 
changed in ways that no policy maker could reasonably have anticipated. 
Or we may find that part or all of the new problem was known or know- 
22 This test of "time lags" from initiation to resolution of a problem in different 
systems was applied in the analysis of economic policy in Western nations pre- 
pared by E. S. Kirschen et al., Economic Policy in Our Time, pp. 265-93. 
124 
This content downloaded from 142.58.129.109 on Sat, 14 Dec 2013 16:32:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Charles W. Anderson 
able when the first policy was adopted. If this is the case, what went 
wrong? Was the decision-making procedure inadequate? Did it frame a 
less than sufficiently complex and problemmatic portrayal of the situa- 
tion for the statesman? 
Of course, since each policy-making process is to some extent a 
"voyage of discovery," 23 it would be quite crude to evaluate a decision 
simply by looking at what happened that was not supposed to happen. 
We must also consider "feedback," the capacity of the system to correct 
itself over time. Thus, one does evaluate the decision made at X in 
terms of the problem at Y, but one does so taking into account the way 
in which policy making between X and Y helps correct for the defi- 
ciencies in the first choice. 
In the design of procedural systems, the most basic and straightfor- 
ward task of the political scientist is simply to inventory the possible 
combinations and sequences of instruments that might be useful in the 
processing of different kinds of problems under specified circumstances. 
The role of comparative analysis is merely that of extending the search 
for ideas and possibilities across national frontiers.24 
The current discussion of the Scandinavian ombudsman institution in 
the United States illustrates the normal course of such analysis. The 
role of the student of comparative politics has been first the conventional 
one of simply describing how the institution works abroad. A few have 
gone beyond to suggest indicated adaptations that might be appropriate 
to the United States. Only in such work as that of Walter Gellhorn, 
however, do we begin to approach the level of inquiry that might be 
expected of true comparative policy analysis. By analyzing the om- 
budsman as part of a more inclusive inventory of approaches to the 
function of protecting citizens against abuses by public authorities, he 
is able to show something of the range of alternatives that exists in the 
modem political repertoire for working with this problem, and he is 
able to suggest some of the advantages and limitations of different ap- 
proaches by comparative analysis.25 
23Albert 0. Hirschman, Development Projects Observed (Washington, 1967), 
p. 35. 
24A good example of a very basic, suggestive use of comparative analysis is 
found in an essay reflecting on the relevance of the Kerner Commission report 
to Great Britain. M. Young, "The Liberal Approach: Weaknesses and Strengths," 
Daedalus, XCVII (Fall 1968), 1379-89. 
25 The literature on the ombudsman is vast. A good sample would include: 
Walter Gellhorn, Ombudsmen and Others (Cambridge [Mass.], 1967); J. M. 
Capozzola, "An American Ombudsman" and James A. Storing, "The Norwe- 
gian Ombudsman for Civil Affairs: The First Three Years," Western Political 
Quarterly, XXI (June 1968), 43-48 and 49-56; C. S. Ascher, 'The Grievance 
Man or Ombudsman," Public Administration Review, XXVII (June 1967), 
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Table 1 A Scheme for the Analysis of Procedural Instruments 
Function Examples Hypothetical Composition Hypothetical Powers 
Initiation: provides a flow of 
suggestions for possible 
public actions 
Formulation: selects and de- 
velops one policy proposal 
Consultation: appraisal of po- 
tential consequences if pro- 
posed action were to be 
undertaken; weighing of 
proposal against alterna- 
tives 
Parties 
Interest groups 
Advisory bodies 
Experts and intellectuals 
Mass media 
Planning agency 
Technical team 
Interest groups 
Advisory committee 
Board of directors represent- 
ing diverse interest (legisla- 
tures, cabinets, etc., may 
also play this role) 
"Public debate" 
Relatively fluid and flexible 
in structure and participa- 
tion to provide open flow 
of information, unless spe- 
cific options are to be ex- 
cluded 
Limited and specialized, "ex- 
pert" membership 
Fairly open membership, 
though relevant test may be 
critical "interest" in pro- 
posed policy 
Quite limited, if any, powers 
to commit system or par- 
ticipants 
Seldom can commit system as 
a whole; may have power 
to commit participants to 
collective responsibility for 
proposal 
Low power to commit system 
or group since discord and 
criticism functional 
0 
0 
0 
N 
s" x 
0 
0 
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Table 1 A Scheme for the Analysis of Procedural Instruments (continued) 
Function Examples Hypothetical Composition Hypothetical Powers 
Aggregation: consolidation of 
support of critical elites to 
proposal 
Collaboration and coordina- 
tion: synchronizes action of 
public and private agencies 
whose action anticipated 
by proposal 
Cabinet 
Legislature 
Parties 
Ad hoc committees of power 
holders 
Planning councils 
Committees 
Limited to relevant elites 
Limited to those performing 
relevant functions 
Characterized by potential 
veto power of participants 
Effort to commit group to fu- 
ture actions, for each par- 
ticipant can hamper pro- 
gram realization 
Ratification: formal, symbolic Chief of state Constitutionally prescribed Formal power to commit sy- 
sanction of program and Legislature stem 
commitment of public re- 
sources and powers 
Feedback: reappraisal of on- Provides decision makers with information on actual consequences and implications of policy. 
going policy in light of May perform any of first five functions 
consequences. 
s* 
rs, I 
0r 
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Systematic inventory is a task that has always appealed to students of 
comparative politics. We need not search for a single master taxonomy 
of procedural instruments. The situation-specific nature of policy analy- 
sis is more apt to require ad hoc formulations for specific problems and 
policy arenas. However, the simple scheme suggested in Table 1 presents 
one generalized approach based on the potential uses of procedural in- 
struments by the decision maker. This outline is adapted from attempts 
to identify stages in the policy-making process.25 Here it is not used as 
a descriptive model. I am not saying that all of these processes can be 
identified in any public decision, nor that there is any reason why they 
must occur in this order.27 This scheme merely indicates some of the 
purposes for which procedural instruments might be used by policy 
makers, and also the possible composition and powers of such instru- 
ments. 
Policy Instrumentation 
Procedural instrumentation, though particularly pertinent to the classic 
concerns of political science, is only one dimension of the task of policy 
analysis. In the design of measures, the selection from among the capa- 
bilities and resources of the state of that package of programs best suited 
to the accomplishment of a public objective is equally important. 
Policy-oriented political scientists are interested in the problem of de- 
fining optimum strategies for coping with public problems. Unfortu- 
nately, the tradition of political science and the training of modern po- 
litical scientists are poorly adapted to such work. Most public issues 
require detailed, expert substantive knowledge. The demographer is 
better prepared to explore the contours of population policy; the ecolo- 
gist, environmental issues. Economists have more powerful general tools 
for weighing the utility of alternative courses of action in achieving 
specified objectives. The political scientist comes to feel that he has little 
relevant expertise of his own to bring to bear on such problems. 
174-77; G. E. Calden and N. Rapheli, "The Ombudsman Debate in Israeli Poli- 
tics," Parlimentary Affairs, XXI (Summer 1967), 201-15; D.C. Rowat, "Recent 
Developments in Ombudsmanship," Canadian Public Administration, X (March 
1967), 35-46; Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
3771 (May 1968) devotes an entire issue to the institution. 
26 See, for example, Harold Lasswell, The Decision Process (College Park, Md., 
1956); Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas 
(Princeton, 1960), pp. 14-16; Kirschen et al., Economic Policy in Our Time, 1: 
265. 
27 For a thorough review of this problem see Morris Davis, "Some Aspects of 
Detroit's Decisional Profile," Administrative Science Quarterly, XII (September 
1967), 211-19. 
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Nonetheless, in the division of labor of the policy sciences, the politi- 
cal scientist should be able to claim some special competence in the 
delineation of the problem-solving capabilities of the public order. When 
all is said and done, there are really only four basic forms of public 
policy, four ways in which the public order can make an impact on the 
society of which it is a part. The state can deploy its political attributes 
as a monopoly of legitimate force and as a focus of authority and prestige 
in the society. As an economic institution, the state can derive resources 
from the society through taxation, borrowing, and sale, and it can spend 
for public purposes. All the great and complex variety of forms, tech- 
niques, and programs of public policy are really elaborations of and 
combinations of these basic possibilities.28 
For comparative policy analysis, one task becomes that of distin- 
guishing the policy repertoire-the stock of policy equipment-that 
has evolved in different political systems. This would include both the 
more general traditions of public action that develop in any polity (direct 
public investment or incentives to private effort as preferred techniques) 
as well as the more idiosyncratic approaches to handling specific types 
of problems (different approaches to urban planning or compensation 
for properties expropriated in agrarian reform programs). 
To establish the distinctiveness of the policy equipment of any political 
system, one must explain why instruments appear in the repertoire of 
some systems and not of others. One approach is to presume as normal 
28 There are several other approaches to the classification of public policies. 
Theodore Lowi suggests a taxonomy based on the distributive, redistributive, and 
regulative effects of public actions. See his "American Business, Public Policy, Case 
Studies and Political Theory," World Politics, XVI (July 1964), 677-715. Gabriel 
Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental 
Approach (Boston, 1966), pp. 190-212, divide the capabilities of a political 
system into extractive, regulative, distributive aspects. Robert A. Dahl and 
Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York, 1963), pp. 
6-17, provide perhaps the most sophisticated classification, posing a number of 
complex continua of choices between public and private ownership, direct and 
indirect control, voluntary and compulsory association, and compulsion or in- 
formation in the settlement of disputes. The most complex taxonomy of policy 
instruments I have ever seen is found in Kirschen et al., Economic Policy in Our 
Time. Here the question of economic choice is posed as a matter of the selection 
from and reconciliation of twelve policy objectives to be implemented by choosing 
from some sixty-three available instruments. In a three-volume work, the Kirschen 
group demonstrates the many comparative uses of this formulation. The scheme 
suggested here is developed further in the author's Politics and Economic Change 
in Latin America (Princeton, 1967), pp. 54-55. An example of an inventory of 
policy technique defined on quite another basis, for a totally different kind of 
public problem, is contained in the analysis of responses to the problem of cul- 
tural pluralism in Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Craw- 
ford Young, Issues of Political Development (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967), pp. 
75-83. 
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the international diffusion of policy technique and then to identify ob- 
stacles or blockages to such diffusion. 
Canons of legitimacy, embodied in ideology, tradition, and constitu- 
tional convention, are one limit on the range of possibilities open to 
public authorities. In some societies, to spur production by the coercive 
mobilization of labor is simply beyond the range of options open to 
government. In others, the same objective may not be pursued by en- 
couraging the competition of private entrepreneurs. In some nations, 
the accepted way of making production decisions will be by trans- 
mitting authoritative commands through a bureaucratic hierarchy. Else- 
where, such techniques will be deplored, and manipulation of taxation 
and monetary systems deemed more satisfactory instruments of economic 
control. 
Historical development is a second factor that influences the range of 
policy equipment available in any polity. Since policy making depends 
so much on habitual responses to problems and on the use of preestab- 
lished equipment, the preferred approach to a particular kind of prob- 
lem may depend heavily on the adaptation of means that have evolved 
from a specific problem-solving situation in the past. 
Extant power relations may also delimit the spread of alternatives 
that will be considered appropriate responses to a given problem. Pro- 
gressive taxation schemes, for example, may be seen to disadvantage 
critical power contenders. Finally, considerations of simple utility may 
preclude the inclusion of a specific item from the "world stock" in the 
agenda of means. The country that does not adopt a policy innovation 
from abroad may just not have the same problem as that which led to the 
creation of a particular policy technique. The agrarian reform mea- 
sures adopted in the Andean American republics may not be pertinent 
to the land tenure practices of West Africa. 
Once the relevant inhibitions to the diffusion of specific policy tech- 
niques are established, it is possible to state the conditions necessary 
for the transfer of a particular tool to a given polity. Tinbergen provides 
the following conceptual formulation of the problem. He defines founda- 
tions as elements connected with values and determining essential hu- 
man relations-voting and property rights, opportunities for education, 
privileges of certain groups, and so forth. Structure connotes the details 
of socioeconomic organization, types of taxes, the market system-in 
short, the means established to achieve foundation objectives. Instru- 
ments in this scheme refer to a class of established means, subject to 
small and frequent changes. Reforms, then, become changes in founda- 
tions (perhaps the introduction of a social security system or the na- 
tionalization of industry). Qualitative policy involves changes in 
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structure (involving perhaps the number and type of taxes), while 
quantitative policy is concerned with incremental changes in an instru- 
ment, such as the tax rate.29 
For the comparative policy analyst, the policy repertoire of a given 
state for coping with a specific problem includes therefore those means 
established and legitimate in the society; a second group of instruments 
that appears in the larger cultural or world stock and is potentially avail- 
able for adoption; a third set that is probably not available to the par- 
ticular polity except under specified conditions of change; and a fourth 
group that is probably unavailable to decision makers, barring regime 
transformation or a general change in the socioeconomic setting of the 
problem. 
Conclusions 
In the coming development of the policy sciences, the task I have out- 
lined for comparative politics seems a modest one. Nonetheless, it is a 
natural and a necessary function. The search for alternatives across 
national frontiers is only one phase of public problem solving, but it does 
accompany the consideration of public business in all societies. The 
question is whether this function can be made more rigorous and sys- 
tematic. 
The construction of procedures for the unraveling of complex prob- 
lems so that significant factors that we can grapple with show through, 
the crafting of instruments to meet these problems-these would seem 
to be pertinent tasks for social science, and for political science in partic- 
ular. In fact, presented this way, they seem totally unexceptional, and 
a very minor recasting of the present agenda of the discipline. But to 
focus on the instruments, on the techniques of governance, may help 
to clarify questions that were previously not quite so meaningful. 
29 Tinbergen, Economic Policy, p. 7. 
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